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Abstract
We conducted a set of experiments to compare the e¤ect of ambiguity in single person
decisions and games. Our results suggest that ambiguity has a bigger impact in games
than in ball and urn problems. We nd that ambiguity has the opposite e¤ect in games
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rms a theoretical prediction made by
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1 Introduction
We report an experimental study on the e¤ects of ambiguity in single person decisions and
games. Risks are said to be ambiguous if the probabilities of possible outcomes are unknown
and it is di¢ cult or impossible to assign subjective probabilities to them. There exists a
substantial body of experimental literature which shows that ambiguity a¤ects single person
decisions. Most economic decisions, however, are not made by individuals, but by groups of
individuals involved in strategic interactions. There is a small experimental literature studying
ambiguity in games.1 However, most of these papers do not test specic theories of behaviour
in ambiguous games. Since many economic problems can be represented as games we believe
this research will be useful for understanding how ambiguity a¤ects the behaviour of economic
systems.
Our paper is an experimental test of Eichberger and Kelsey (2002), which predicts that
ambiguity has opposite e¤ects in games of strategic complements and substitutes. In the case
of strategic substitutes, increasing the level of ambiguity would shift the equilibrium strategies
in an ex-post Pareto improving direction, whereas for strategic complements, an increase in
ambiguity would have the opposite e¤ect.2 Thus it was hypothesised that ambiguity had an
adverse e¤ect in games with strategic complements, but was helpful in attaining an ex-post
Pareto e¢ cient outcome in games with strategic substitutes. In order to implement this, we
need to nd a way of introducing ambiguity into a game setting, without lying to the subjects.
We adapt the experimental design of Kilka andWeber (2001) who nd that subjects are more
ambiguity-averse when the returns of an investment are dependent on foreign securities than
when they are linked to domestic securities. In our games, subjects were either matched with a
local opponent or with a foreign one who was intended to be the analogy of the foreign securities.
We hypothesised that subjects will be more ambiguity-averse with the foreign opponents. In
order to test this, we recruited subjects both locally at the University of Exeter as well as
1See for instance Calford (2016), Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008), Greiner (2016), Ivanov (2011)
Kelsey and le Roux (2015) or Di Mauro and Castro (2011).
2We refer to an ex-post Pareto improvement since this e¢ ciency measure does not take into account any
ex-ante losses in utility due to ambiguity-aversion.
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overseas in St. Stephens College, India.
In addition we also alternated the games with Ellsberg Urn type decision problems. This
was done in order to test whether there was any di¤erence in ambiguity-attitude between
the types of decision. Moreover, it allowed us to elicit an independent measure of subjects
ambiguity-attitudes. Finally it acted to erase subjects short term memory.
We nd that behaviour broadly supports our hypotheses. However, subjects do not display
an increase in ambiguity when faced by foreign opponents. This is in line with ndings reported
in Kelsey and le Roux (2016). Another interesting observation from the data is that even though
subjects display ambiguity-aversion when faced by other opponents (whether local or foreign),
they often are ambiguity seeking when faced by nature in single-person decisions. This is
consistent with an earlier study Kelsey and le Roux (2015), where subjects showed di¤erences
in ambiguity-attitudes based on the scenario they were facing.
Organisation of the Paper In Section 2, we describe the theory being tested. Section 3
and 4 describe the experimental model and design employed, Section 5 consists of data analysis
and results, Section 6 reviews related literature and Section 7 provides a summary of results
together with future avenues of research.
2 Preferences and Equilibrium under Ambiguity
In this section we shall explain how we model ambiguity in games. Our notation is as follows.
A 2-player game   = hf1; 2g ;X1; X2; u1; u2i consists of players, i = 1; 2, nite pure strategy
sets Xi and payo¤ functions ui (xi; x i) for each player. The notation, x i; denotes the strategy
chosen by is opponent and the set of all strategies for is opponent is X i: The space of all
strategy proles is denoted by X:
We shall model ambiguity by neo-additive preferences which have been axiomatised by
Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007). These preferences may be represented by the
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function:
Vi(xi)=δiαi minx i∈x iui(xi,x−i)+δi(1−αi) maxx i∈X iui(xi,x−i)+(1−δi)Eπiui(xi,x−i),
whereEπidenotesconventionalexpectationwithrespecttotheprobabilitydistributionπi.
Thisexpressionisaweightedaverageofthehighestpayoﬀ,thelowestpayoﬀandanaverage
payoﬀ.Theresponsetoambiguityispartlyoptimisticrepresentedbytheweightgiventothe
bestoutcomeandpartlypessimistic.ThesepreferencesareaspecialcaseofChoquetexpected
utility(CEU),Schmeidler(1989).Thustheymayalsoberepresentedintheform
Vi(xi)= ui(xi,x−i)dνi(x−i),
whereνiisaneo-additivecapacityonX−iandtheintegralisaChoquetintegral,Choquet
(1953-4).3Wedeﬁnethesupportofaneo-additivecapacitytobethesupportoftheadditive
probabilityonwhichitisbased,i.e.suppνi=suppπi.4
Aplayerhasapossiblyambiguousbeliefaboutwhathis/heropponentwildo.Ingames,
πiisdeterminedendogenouslyasthepredictionoftheplayersfromtheknowledgeofthegame
structureandthepreferencesofothers.Incontrast,wetreatthedegreesofoptimism,αiand
ambiguity,δi,asexogenous. Deﬁnethebest-responsecorrespondenceofplayerigiventhat
his/herbeliefsarerepresentedbyaneo-additivecapacityνibyRi(νi)=argmaxxi∈XiVi(xi).
Wecannowdeﬁneequilibriumunderambiguity.
Deﬁnition2.1(EquilibriumunderAmbiguity) Apairofneo-additivecapacities(ν∗1,ν∗2)
isanEquilibriumUnderAmbiguity(EUA)iffori=1,2,supp(ν∗i)⊆R−i(ν∗−i).
AnEUAwilexistforanygivenambiguity-attitudeoftheplayers,(seeEichbergerand
Kelsey(2014)foraproof).Inequilibriumeachplayerusesastrategywhichisabestresponse
givenhis/herbeliefs. Aplayerperceivesambiguityaboutthestrategyofhis/heropponent.
3A neo-additive-capacityνionX−iisdeﬁnedbyνi(X−i|αi,δi,πi) =1,νi(∅|αi,δi,πi) =0and
νi(A|αi,δi,πi)=(1−αi)δi+(1−δi)πi(A)for∅ A X−i,where0 δi<1,πiisanadditiveprob-
abilitydistributiononX−i.4ForajustiﬁcationofthisdeﬁnitionanditsrelationtoothersupportnotionsseeEichbergerandKelsey
(2014).
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This is represented by an ambiguous belief, in the form of a capacity over the opponents
strategy space. The support of a players beliefs is itself an ambiguous event. This reects
some uncertainty about whether or not his/her opponents play best responses. Players respond
to this ambiguity partly in an optimistic way by over-weighting the best outcome and partly
in a pessimistic way by over-weighting the worst outcome.
Consistency between beliefs and actions is achieved by requiring that all strategies in the
support of a players beliefs be a best response for his/her opponent. This is a weaker notion
of consistency than that used in Nash equilibrium. However Greiner (2016) has experimental
evidence which shows that behaviour does not satisfy stronger notions of consistency even in
relatively simple games. Moreover the violations of consistency he nds are compatible with
our theory.
A common interpretation of NE is that each player chooses a strategy which maximises
his/her utility given the strategy of the other players. However it is also possible to view NE
as an equilibrium in beliefs. From this viewpoint each player has a subjective belief about
the actions of his/her opponents and chooses a best response to this belief. Denition 2.1
extends the interpretation of NE as an equilibrium in beliefs, by allowing these beliefs to be
non-additive. We interpret the deviation from additivity as representing ambiguity about the
opponents strategy choice.
3 Experimental Model
In this section, we introduce the games used in our experiments, followed by the Ellsberg-style
decision problems being studied by us. Henceforth we will use male pronouns he, his etc. to
denote the Row Player, while female pronouns she, hers etc. will be used to denote the Column
Player.5
5This convention is for the sake of convenience only and does not bear any relation to the actual gender of
the subjects in our experiments.
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3.1 The Games
The games used in our experimental sessions can be seen in Figure 1: Games (SC1) and (SC2)
(as labelled in Figure 1) are games with strategic complements and positive externalities; while
Games (SS1) and (SS2), were games with strategic substitutes. Game SS1 also has negative
externalities.
Figure 1: The Games
The following result is the main theoretical prediction, which our experiments are designed to
test. In the appendix we provide two examples illustrate it. These are based on our experimental
games. A formal proof can be found in Eichberger and Kelsey (2014).
Proposition 3.1 If both players are ambiguity averse, i.e.  = 1; and have neo-additive
preferences then6:
1. In the case of games with strategic complements and positive (resp. negative) external-
ities, the equilibrium strategy under ambiguity of an agent with neo-additive beliefs, is
decreasing (resp. increasing) in ambiguity.
2. In the case of games with strategic substitutes and negative (resp. positive) externalities,
the equilibrium strategy under ambiguity of an agent with neo-additive beliefs, is decreasing
(resp. increasing) in ambiguity.
6It might be worth noting that Eichberger and Kelsey (2014) present a stronger result for more general CEU
preferences.
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Games (SC1) and (SC2) are games with strategic complements and positive externalities.
This can be veried if we x the order T < C < B and L < M < R: Both games have one
pure Nash equilibrium: (C;M): The equilibrium under ambiguity for these games is (T;M):
Game (SS1) is a strategic substitutes game with negative externalities and multiple Nash
equilibria, if we x T > C > B and L > M > R: The game has three pure Nash equilibria:
(T;R); (C;M) and (B;L); none of which are focal. The equilibrium under ambiguity for
this game is (B;R): Game (SS2) is a strategic substitutes game if we x T > C > B and
L > M > R: The game has a unique Nash equilibrium: (C;M): The equilibrium under
ambiguity for this game is (B;R): For both strategic substitutes games the Nash equilibrium
Pareto dominates the equilibrium with ambiguity.
3.2 Ellsberg Urn Experiments
The game rounds were alternated with single person decision problems similar to the Ellsberg
Urn experiment. Subjects were presented with an urn containing 90 balls, of which 30 were
labelled X, and the remainder were an unknown proportion of Y or Z balls. The decisions put
to the subjects took the following form:
An urn contains 90 balls, of which 30 are labelled X. The remainder are either Y or Z.
Which of the following options do you prefer?
a) Payo¤ of  if an X ball is drawn.
b) Payo¤ of 100 if a Y ball is drawn.
c) Payo¤ of 100 if a Z ball is drawn.
Payo¤  attached to the option X was changed from round to round, with  = 95;
90; 80; 100; 105 (in that order), to measure the ambiguity threshold of subjects. If  = 100 this
is equivalent to the 3-ball version of the Ellsberg Paradox. In the case  = 105 we are testing
whether some subjects would choose to bet on an ambiguous ball even though it has a lower
expected return, (according to a uniform prior). This is a feature not present in many previous
experimental tests of the Ellsberg Paradox.
In our Ellsberg urn experiments, we use balls labelled X; Y and Z, rather than following
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the traditional practice of using Red, Blue and Yellow coloured balls.7 This is because in a
previous set of experiments Kelsey and le Roux (2015), we used coloured balls and found that
subjects often chose Blue (the ambiguous option), simply because they had a fondness for the
colour blue. Similarly, we found a large number of Chinese subjects chose Red, because it was
considered auspiciousin Chinese culture. In this study we use balls labelled X; Y and Z; in
order to avoid biases of this sort.
4 Experimental Design
The games described above were used in paper-based experiments, conducted at St. Stephens
College in New Delhi, India, and at the Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory
in Exeter (FEELE), UK. All the subjects recruited at St. Stephens College were Indian
nationals, who (by assumption) had an Indian sociocultural upbringing. While sending out
the invitations to recruit subjects at the University of Exeter, we took particular care to weed
out any foreign students who were Indian. As such, the subjects recruited at FEELE had a
di¤erent sociocultural upbringing. We expected this di¤erence in backgrounds would create
ambiguity on the part of Exeter subjects.
The experiments were conducted with three di¤erent treatments.
 In Treatment I, subjects were matched against other local subjects (this treatment analy-
ses data from Delhi vs. Delhi and Exeter vs. Exeter sessions).8
 Treatment II consisted of matching Exeter subjects against an Indian opponent. Sub-
jects were told that the same experiments had been run in India and that they would
be matched up against an Indian subject whose responses had been already collected.9
7The traditional Ellsberg urn contains Red, Blue and Yellow coloured balls. The number of Red balls in the
urn is known, while the remaining Blue and Yellow coloured balls are ambiguous in number.
8A probit regression showed that the dummy variable for location (Delhi=Exeter) does not have a signicant
impact on choosing the ambiguity safe option. Thus for the purpose of analysing subject behaviour in Treatment
I, we have combined the data from sessions where Delhi subjects played against other Delhi subjects (local vs.
local) with data from the Exeter vs. Exeter session, without the loss of e¢ ciency.
9Subjects knew that their choice would not a¤ect the actual payo¤ of foreign players, while this was the
case when they played the games against local opponents. As a result, when comparing behaviour in the games
to test the role of ambiguity, we note that there may be a social preferences confound: subjects might have
behaved di¤erently when playing against foreign opponents simply because their choices did not a¤ect the payo¤
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Cultural studies conducted in the past have shown that western societies are individual-
oriented, while Asian cultures tend to be collectivist. Members of Asian cultures have
larger social networks that they can fall back upon in the event of an emergency/loss.
This makes them more risk/ambiguity-seeking than their western counterparts, Weber
and Hsee (1998). Kelsey and Peryman (2015) nd that British subjects in particular, act
in a way that indicates they believe Asian opponents will behave more cautiously than
other British opponents. As such, we expected that subjects would be more ambiguous
when matched against opponents who are from a di¤erent sociocultural background than
themselves.
 In Treatment III, subjects were matched against both internationally as well as locally
recruited subjects, for the purpose of payment.
Treatments I and III consisted of 60 subjects each and Treatment II had 61 subjects. In
total there were 181 subjects who took part in the experiment, 81 of whom were males and the
remaining 100 were females. Each session lasted a maximum of 45 minutes including payment.
Subjects rst read through a short, comprehensive set of instructions at their own pace,
following this the instructions were also read out to all the participants in general.10 The
subjects were asked to ll out practice questions to check that they understood the games
correctly. Once the practice questions had been answered and discussed, the actual set of
experimental questions were handed out to the subjects. Subjects were randomly assigned the
role of either a Row Player or a Column Player at the beginning of the experiment, for the
purpose of matching in the games, and remained in the same role for the rest of the experiment.
Each subject had to select one option per round: Top/Centre/Bottom if they were a Row
Player or Left/Middle/Right if they were a Column Player, and in case of the Ellsberg urn
rounds X, Y or Z. In the Ellsberg urn rounds, the pay-o¤s attached to drawing a Y or Z
ball were held constant at 100, while those attached to drawing an X ball varied as 95, 90,
80; 100; 105:
of somebody else.
10The experimental protocols can be found at the following link: http://saraleroux.weebly.com/experimental-
protocols.html
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Once subjects had made all decisions, a throw of dice determined one game round and
one Ellsberg urn round for which subjects would be paid. Subjects in India were paid a
show-up fee of Rs:200 ($2:50), together with their earnings from the chosen round, where
100ECU = Rs:200: Exeter subjects were paid a show-up fee of $3, together with their earnings
from the chosen round, where 100ECU = $2:11 In order to prevent individuals from self-
insuring against payo¤ risks across rounds, we picked one round at random for payment, see
Charness and Genicot (2009).12 Playersdecisions were matched according to a predetermined
matching, and pay-o¤s were announced.
Instead of using a real urn we used a computer to simulate the drawing of a ball from the
urn.13 The computer used a normal distribution to randomly assign the number of Y and Z
balls in the urn so that they summed to 60, while keeping the number of X balls xed at 30
and the total number of balls in the urn at 90:14 The computer then simulated an independent
ball draw for each subject. If the label of the ball drawn by the computer matched that chosen
by the subject, it entitled him to the payo¤ specied in the round chosen for payment.
5 Data Analysis and Results
5.1 Row Player Behaviour
See Figure 2, for a summary of row player behaviour. In Treatment I, we nd that a large
majority of our subjects, 63% in SC1 and 73% in SC2, chose the ambiguity-safe option T in
our experiments. In comparison, only 13% (SC1) and 17% (SC2) of subjects chose C, the
choice under Nash. Binomial Test A (See Table 1) nds that subjects chose the ambiguity-safe
11The experiments were conducted between November 2010 - February 2011. The exchange rate during the
period was 1 GBP = 80 INR. Our aim was that the average earnings from our experiment which lasted a
maximum of 30 minutes, should be able to a¤ord subjects (university students) the chance purchase a meal and
a non-alcoholic drink. The purchasing power parity that we were aiming for was a burger meal.
12If all rounds count equally towards the nal payo¤, subjects are likely to try and accumulate a high payo¤
in the rst few rounds and then care less about how they decide in the following rounds. In contrast, if subjects
know that they will be paid for a random round, they treat each decision with care.
13The computer simulated urn can be found at the following link: http://saraleroux.weebly.com/experimental-
protocols.html
14The number of Y balls in the urn were determined using the MSExcel command "=ROUND-
DOWN(RAND()*61,0)", and the number of Z balls in the urn were simply = (60 minus the number of Y
balls).
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Figure 2: Row Player Behaviour
option signicantly more often than either of the other options. Similarly, in SS1 and SS2
we nd that 50% and 67% of subjects chose the ambiguity-safe option B. It is interesting to
note that when multiple Nash equilibria are present (in SS1), 40% of the subjects select the
Nash (C;M)  which gives an equal payo¤ to both players. This might indicate that fairness
constraints a¤ect these subjects more than ambiguity. As such, Binomial Test B nds that
subjects choose the ambiguity-safe option B; signicantly more often in SS2, but fails to reject
this hypothesis for SS1 (See Table 1, Row 5):
In Treatment II, we nd that 83% and 87% of subjects chose the ambiguity-safe strategy
T in SC1 and SC2, respectively, compared to 7% (2) and 13% of subjects who chose C (the
choice under Nash equilibrium). When compared to the base treatment, it is clear that subjects
perceived greater ambiguity in this situation (when faced by the foreign subject). As can be
seen in Table 1 (Row 6), subjects chose the ambiguity safe option signicantly more often than
the other two options available to them. In the strategic substitutes game SS1 and SS2; 50%
and 67% of subjects chose B, the choice under EUA: Even though we perceive heightened
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ambiguity on the part of the subjects, about half of them (43%); opt for the Nash outcome
which would result in equitable pay-o¤s for both players. Binomial Test B cannot be rejected
for SS1; however, we do reject the null at a 5% level of signicance for SS2:
Table 1: Binomial Tests A and B - Results
Test: Z-score for Binomial Test A Z-score for Binomial Test B
Null Hypothesis (H0): prob(T ) = prob(C +B) = 0:5 prob(B) = prob(T + C) = 0:5
Alt. Hypothesis (H1): prob(T ) > prob(C +B) prob(B) > prob(T + C)
Game: SC1 SC2 SS1 SS2
Treatment I 1.465059** 2.55604*** 0 1.82574**
Treatment II 3.65148*** 4.01663*** 0 1.82574**
Treatment III vs. LS 1.82574** 1.82574** 1.82574** 1.09544
Treatment III vs. FS 1.46505* 0 0 1.82574**
*, **, *** indicate signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
In Treatment III, Exeter subjects were asked to make decisions versus both the local (Exeter)
as well as the foreign (Indian) opponent. They were allowed to choose di¤erent actions against
the foreign opponent and the domestic one. See the bottom half of Figure 2, for a summary of
Row Player behaviour. We nd that fewer subjects chose the ambiguity-safe option T; against
the foreign opponent than against the local opponent, in both SC1 and SC2. It is interesting
to note that subjects chose the ambiguity-safe option signicantly more often against the local
opponent, but not against the foreign subject (See Table 1, Rows 7 and 8). We nd similar
behaviour in game SS1; where fewer subjects took the ambiguity-safe option versus the foreign
subject than against the local subject. Play in SS2; was closer to our expectations, and subjects
chose the ambiguity-safe option more against the foreign subject than the local one.
Table 2: Correlation in Row Player Behaviour between Games Rounds
Game/Action: SC1_ASO SC2_ASO SS1_ASO SS2_ASO
SC1_ASO 1:000
SC2_ASO 0:724 1:000
SS1_ASO 0:504 0:484 1:000
SS2_ASO 0:637 0:619 0:559 1:000
We nd that there is a signicant amount of correlation between subjectschoice of the
ambiguity-safe option (ASO) between the four games (See Table 2). However, when we in-
vestigate whether there is any correlation between row players who consistently choose the
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ambiguity-safe option in the game rounds, with their choice in the Ellsberg Urn rounds, we nd
a weak negative correlation. The row players seemed to display a pessimistic attitude towards
ambiguity in the game rounds, but displayed an optimistic attitude towards ambiguity in the
Urn rounds.
5.2 Column Player Behaviour
See Figure 3; for a summary of Column Player behaviour. In Treatment I, we nd that 70%
and 87% of subjects chose the Nash strategy M in SC1 and SC2, respectively.15 Binomial
Test C nds that subjects choose the Nash/EUA option signicantly more often than either of
the other two choices (See Table 3, Row 5). In the strategic substitutes games SS1 and SS2;
we nd that 80% and 77% of subjects choose the ambiguity-safe strategy R; in comparison to
13% and 20% of subjects that chose M (the choice under Nash). Binomial Test D nds that
subjects choose the ambiguity-safe option M; signicantly more often than L + R (Table 3,
Row 5).
In Treatment II, 87% and 100% of subjects choose the Nash/EUA strategy M , in SC1 and
SC2 respectively. As might be expected, Binomial Test C can be rejected at a 1% level for
both SC1 and SC2 (See Table 3, Row 6): In games SS1 and SS2;we nd 71% and 65% of
subjects chose the ambiguity-safe strategy R. Binomial Test D is rejected at 1% for SS1 and
at 5% for SS2 (Table 3, Row 5). As such, we do see evidence that subjects seek to take the
ambiguity-safe option against the foreign subject. Moreover, we encouraged subjects to write a
short account at the end of the experiment, about their reactions and what they were thinking
about when they made their choices. A number concluded that they preferred to stick with
a safe (but denite) payo¤ rather than take a chance and lose out, since they were not sure
what prompted the foreign opponents decision choices. Thus these subjects were willing to
forego the possibility of a higher payo¤, in order to avoid an option which they perceived as
ambiguous.
In Treatment III, subjects were matched against both local as well as foreign opponents. We
15Note in the case of SC1 and SC2, the equilibrium action under ambiguity coincides with the Nash strategy,
for the Column player.
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Figure 3: Column Player Behaviour
expected the subjects to perceive more ambiguity with a foreign opponent. See Figure 3 (lower
half of gure), for a summary of Column Player behaviour in Treatment III. It is clear that a
large majority of the subjects are choosing the Nash in SC1 and SC2; however, fewer subjects
chose it against the foreign subject. Binomial Test C shows that the Nash/EUA option was
the signicant choice of subjects, in both SC1 and SC2; and against both local and foreign
opponents. In game SS1; we nd that 70% and 77% of subjects chose the ambiguity-safe
strategy R; against the local and foreign subject respectively. In SS2; half the subjects chose
the ambiguity-safe strategy while the other half chose the Nash against the local opponent.
When faced with the foreign opponent, 60% chose the ambiguity-safe option while 40% chose it
under Nash. It can be noted that in both the strategic substitutes rounds, the ambiguity-safe
option was chosen more often against the foreign subject. As before, we conduct Binomial Test
D and reject the null at 5% against the local opponent and 1% against foreign opponents for
SS1. We fail to reject the null for SS2, since the decisions were very close to the 50  50 mark.
13
Table 3: Binomial Tests C and D - Results
Test: Z-score for Binomial Test C Z-score for Binomial Test D
Null Hypothesis H0: prob(M) = prob(L+R) = 0:5 prob(R) = prob(L+M) = 0:5
Alt. Hypothesis H1: prob(M) > prob(L+R) prob(R) > prob(L+M)
Game: SC1 SC2 SS1 SS2
Treatment I 2.19089** 4.01663*** 3.28633*** 2.92119***
Treatment II 4.13092*** 5.56776*** 2.33487*** 1.61645**
Treatment III vs. LS 4.74693*** 4.74693*** 2.19089** 0
Treatment III vs. FS 3.65148*** 4.38178*** 2.92119*** 1.09445
*, **, *** indicate signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
However, it is clear in both SS1 as well as SS2; that the ambiguity-safe option was chosen
more often against the foreign subject.
We ran probit regressions to ascertain what factors inuenced subjects in their choice of the
ambiguity-safe option: Dummy variables were dened to capture the characteristics of the data
such as: Quant = 1, if the subject was doing a quantitative degree (Quant = 0; for degrees
like English, History, Philosophy, Politics etc.); Male = 1, if gender is male (0; otherwise);
and various dummies for the separate treatments and games (T1; T2 or T3LS=T3FS for the
various treatments and SC_1, SC_2, SS_1 and SS_2 for the di¤erent game rounds).
A probit regression of Amb_Safe_Option (choice of the ambiguity safe option) was on the
various dummies found that Quant, and the various treatment dummies were insignicant.
Thus, we note that there was no signicant di¤erence in the number of people choosing the
ambiguity-safe option between the treatments. A probit regression of Amb_Safe_Option on
Male and the dummies for the game rounds; has a chi-squared ratio of 45:51 with a p-value of
0:0000; which shows that the model as a whole is statistically signicant.16 Regression results
are seen below.17
Amb_Safe_Option = 0:502  0:207(Male) + 0:671(SC_1) + 1:101(SC_2) + 0:336(SS_1)
We note that subjects are more likely to choose the ambiguity-safe option in games with strate-
16The dummy for SS_2 was dropped from the probit regression, in order to avoid the dummy variable trap.
17The coe¢ cients from a probit regression do not have the same interpretation as coe¢ cients from an Ordinary
Least Squares regression. From the probit results, we can interpret that males are less likely to choose the
ambiguity safe option: If a subject is male, their z-score decreases by 3:01. Moreover, subjects are more likely
to choose the ambiguity-safe option in SC1 : the z-score increases by 3:73; in SC2 : the z-score increases by
5:42; and for SS1: the z-score increases by 1:97; when compared to the base which is game SS2:
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gic complements than those with strategic substitutes. Moreover, males are signicantly less
likely to take the ambiguity-safe option than females.
Table 4: Correlation in Column Player Behaviour between Games Rounds
Game/Action: SC1_ASO SC2_ASO SS1_ASO SS2_ASO
SC1_ASO 1:000
SC2_ASO 0:801 1:000
SS1_ASO 0:622 0:725 1:000
SS2_ASO 0:537 0:619 0:729 1:000
Once again we found a strong correlation between subjectschoice of the ambiguity-safe
option (ASO) between the four games (See Table 4). However, the correlation choices in the
game rounds and the Ellsberg Urn rounds, was weakly negative. Column player behaviour was
consistent with row player behaviour, in that subjects displayed pessimism towards ambiguity
in the game rounds, and optimism towards ambiguity in the Urn rounds.
5.3 Behaviour in Ellsberg Urn Rounds
The strategic complement and substitute games were alternated with Ellsberg Urn decisions,
in order to elicit an ambiguity threshold of the subjects. Moreover, it enabled us to evaluate
whether the ambiguity-attitude of subjects remained consistent between single person decisions,
and situations where they were faced by ambiguity created by interacting with other players.
The payo¤ on drawing X (the unambiguous event) was varied as  = 95; 90; 85; 100 or 105
ECU; depending on the round being played.
As can be seen in Figure 5; for  = 100 (the standard Ellsberg urn decision problem), 73%
(133) of subjects chose X, while 27% (48) chose to bet on Y and Z:18 This result is consistent
with previous studies.
When there is a premium attached to X, i.e., when  = 105; a majority of subjects (73%)
opt for X: However, what is more interesting to note is that 27% of subjects opt for Y + Z:
These subjects are willing to take a lower payo¤, in order to choose Y or Z - the balls whose
18We consider the sum of the people who chose Y and Z, rather than the number of people who chose Y or
Z balls individually, in order to negate any e¤ect of people choosing Y just because it appeared before Z on
the choice set.
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Figure 4: Subject Behaviour in Ellsberg Urn Rounds
Figure 5:
proportion is unknown! We believe this captures ambiguity-seeking behaviour on the part of
the subjects.
Even a small penalty on X from  = 100 to  = 95; leads to a big rise in the number
of subjects choosing Y + Z: When  = 95; 74% (134) of subjects choose Y + Z: This goes
up substantially to 81% (146) of subjects choosing Y + Z; when  = 85: Most subjects are
not ambiguity-averse enough to bear a small penalty, in order to continue choosing X (the
unambiguous event). It is signicant that 19% (35) of subjects chose X; even when X = 85;
thus displaying strong ambiguity-averse behaviour.
We ran probit regressions to ascertain what factors inuenced subjects in their choice of X
(the unambiguous ball): Dummy variables were dened to capture the characteristics of the data
such as: Quant = 1, if the subject was doing a quantitative degree (Quant = 0; otherwise.);
Male = 1, if gender is male (0; otherwise); L_105; L_100; L_95; L_90; L_85 = 1, depending
on the value took in that particular round.
A probit regression of X on the various -value dummies L_105; L_95; L_90; L_85; has
a chi-squared ratio of 201:29 with a p-value of 0:0000; which shows that our model as a whole
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is statistically signicant.19 Regression results are seen below.20
X = 0:627  0:033(L_105)  1:27(L_95)  0:96(L_90)  1:49(L_85)
There was no signicant di¤erence in the choice of X when  = 105 and 100: However, for
 = 95; 90 and 85; subjects chose X signicantly less often than when  = 100:
At the individual level, of the 133 subjects that chose X when  = 100; 68 switched to
Y + Z at  = 95; 7 switched to Y + Z at  = 90; 5 switched to Y + Z at  = 85; while 21
subjects chose X for all values of : Looking more closely at the choices of the subjects who
always chose X; we nd that 9 of them always chose the ambiguity-safe options in the game
rounds.21 Thus, a very small subset of our subject pool (5%), showed strong ambiguity-averse
behaviour.
Looking at the 49 subjects who chose Y + Z when  = 105; we nd that 11 of them never
choseX in the Urn rounds. However, 12 of these 49 subjects always chose the ambiguity-safe op-
tions in the game rounds these subjects seem to have a context-dependant ambiguity-attitude:
ambiguity-loving in single person decisions and ambiguity-averse in the game environment.
Table 5: Binomial Tests E and F - Results
Test: Z-score for Binomial Test E Z-score for Binomial Test F
Null Hypothesis H0: prob(X) = prob(Y + Z) = 0:5 prob(X) = prob(Y + Z) = 0:5
Alt. Hypothesis H1: prob(X) > prob(Y + Z) prob(Y + Z) > prob(X)
 = 105 6.169***
 = 100 6.318***
 = 95 6.467***
 = 90 3.493***
 = 85 8.251***
*, **, *** indicate signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
We conducted Binomial Tests E and F as described in Table 5. We nd that subjects
choose the unambiguous ball X signicantly more often for  = 105 and 100; but prefer the
ambiguous balls Y +Z for lower values of : On the whole, subjects seem to prefer bettingon
19The dummy for L_100 was dropped from the probit regression, in order to avoid the dummy variable trap.
Dummies for Quant and Male were found to be insignicant, and were thus dropped from the nal regression.
20From the probit results, we can interpret that when  = 105: the z-score decreases by 0:03; for  = 95: the
z-score decreases by 1:27; for  = 90: the z-score decreases by 0:96; for  = 85: the z-score decreases by 1:49;
when compared to the base which is  = 100:
21Of these, 7 were Column Players and the remaining 2 were Row Players.
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Y and Z. Responses gathered from the subjects showed that subjects viewed the urn rounds
as gambles. The justication given for this was that the computer could have picked any
of the three options - thus Y or Z balls could have been more in number than X balls, that
were capped at 30 balls. The subjects thus displayed an optimistic attitude towards ambiguity.
Moreover, some subjects treated these rounds as based on luck rather than reasoning.22
6 Related Literature
6.1 Ambiguity in games
Our study builds upon the theoretical paper by Eichberger and Kelsey (2002). They nd
that in a game with positive (resp. negative) externalities, ambiguity prompts a player to put
an increased (resp. decreased) weight on the lowest of his opponents actions. The marginal
benet that the player gets from his own action gets decreased (resp. increased) in the case of a
game with strategic complements (resp. substitutes). In the presence of positive externalities,
players often have the incentive to use a strategy below the Pareto optimal level, and so, the
resultant Nash equilibrium is ine¢ cient. In the case of strategic substitutes, increasing the level
of ambiguity would cause a shift in equilibrium strategies towards an ex-post Pareto e¢ cient
outcome, whereas for strategic complements, an increase in ambiguity would cause a shift in
equilibrium, away from the ex-post Pareto e¢ cient outcome. Hence it was hypothesised that
ambiguity had an adverse e¤ect in case of games with strategic complements, but was helpful in
the case of games with strategic substitutes. Ambiguity thus causes a decrease in equilibrium
actions in a game of strategic complements and positive externalities or the opposite case,
i.e., strategic substitutes and negative externalities. This result can be applied to a model
of voluntary contributions to a public good. It implies that if the good is produced under
decreasing returns to scale then an increase in ambiguity should increase contributions and
thus provision of the public good.
22One subject in particular noted thatThe urn question is pure luck, because majority of the unmarked
balls are either Y or Z; and choosing either is a gamble.
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DiMauro and Castro (2011) conduct a set of experiments designed to test whether ambiguity
or altruism causes an increase in contribution to the public good in the above case. In order to
negate the chance that altruism, or a feeling of reciprocation prompted the subjectsactions, the
subjects were informed that their opponent would be a virtual agent and the opponents play
was simulated by a computer. Subjects played in two scenarios, one with risk, the other with
ambiguity. It was noted that contributions were signicantly higher when the situation was
one of ambiguity. The results showed that there was indeed evidence that ambiguity was the
cause of increased contribution. This is akin to the results found in our paper that ambiguity
signicantly a¤ects the decisions made by individuals, in a manner that depends directly on
the strategic nature of the game in consideration.
Another paper that studies strategic ambiguity in games experimentally, is Eichberger,
Kelsey, and Schipper (2008). In common with the present paper, it used the identity of the
opponent to introduce ambiguity in the experiment. They studied games in which subjects
faced either the experimenters grandmother (who was described as being ignorant of economic
strategy), a game theorist (who was described as a successful professor of economics), or an-
other student as an opponent. The key hypothesis being tested was that ambiguity has the
opposite e¤ect in games of strategic complements and substitutes. Ambiguity averse actions
were chosen signicantly more often against the granny than against the game theorist, irre-
spective of whether the game was one of strategic complements, strategic substitutes or one
with multiple equilibria. When the level of ambiguity the subjects faced while playing the
granny was compared to that of the subjects faced playing against each other, it was found
that the players still found the granny a more ambiguous opponent.
The paper also tested whether ambiguity had the opposite e¤ect in games of strategic
complements and substitutes. This is similar to Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2008) who
also conclude that comparative statics broadly support the theoretical prediction. Subjects
were also found to react to variations in the level of ambiguity, which was tested by altering
the cardinal payo¤ in the game while keeping the ordinal payo¤ structure unchanged. It can
thus be seen that subjects react not only to ambiguity on the part of the opponent, but also
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to subtle changes in the payo¤ structures of the experiment.
Kelsey and Peryman (2015) study experiments with stag hunt and bargaining coordination
games. They use a between-subjects design to vary the identity of the opponent to see whether
cultural norms or identity play a part in coordination decisions. They nd that players do
appear to use cultural stereotypes to predict behaviour, especially in the bargaining game. In
particular, British subjects act in a manner that indicates they believe Asian subjects will
behave more cautiously. In our experiments we failed to see subjects react more ambiguously
towards foreign opponents and as such, our subjects did not vary their actions on cultural
stereotypes.
Ivanov (2011), discusses the ndings of a series of experiments on normal form games run
to distinguish between eighteen types of players. A person was classied on the basis of his
attitude to ambiguity - as being either ambiguity averse, ambiguity neutral, or ambiguity loving;
on the basis of his attitude to risk - as being risk averse, risk neutral or risk loving; and whether
he played strategically or naively. A person who played in a naive manner was modelled as
having a uniform belief in every game he played, whereas if he played strategically, his beliefs
were di¤erent for every game and were thus unrestricted. The study nds that about 32% of
the subjects taking part in the experiment were ambiguity loving, as opposed to 22% who were
ambiguity averse. The majority of subjects (46%) were found to be ambiguity neutral. While
being tested on the basis of their attitude to risk, 62% of the subjects were found to be risk
averse, 36% to be risk neutral, and a mere 2% were risk loving. 90% of the subjects played in
a strategic manner, while 10% played naively. These results are opposite to ours, since we nd
more subjects who are ambiguity averse than those who are ambiguity seeking, in the game
rounds.
The study by Ivanov (2011) questions the fact that there are more subjects who are ambi-
guity loving/neutral, than those who are ambiguity averse, given that on average a majority of
them play strategically. This is attributed to playersaltruistic behaviour, i.e., they played in a
manner that would maximise the sum of both playerspay-o¤s. This may be because a player
is willing to compromise with his opponent, in order to do well himself.
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While our study concentrated on investigating individual behaviour in the presence of am-
biguity, Keller, Sarin, and Sounderpandian (2007) investigate whether individuals deciding
together as pairs (termed dyads in the paper) display ambiguity averse behaviour. Participants
were initially asked to state how much they were willing to pay for six monetary gambles. Five
of the six gambles put before the subjects involved ambiguity, while the sixth involved no am-
biguity. Once the participants had all disclosed their individual willingness to pay, they were
randomly paired with another subject and each pair had to re-specify how much they were
willing to pay for the six gambles. It was found that the pairs displayed risk averse as well
as ambiguity averse preferences. It was observed that the willingness-to-pay among pairs of
individuals deciding together, was lower than the average of their individual willingness-to-pay
for gambles. They thus conclude that ambiguity averse behaviour is prevalent in group settings.
In our experiments, we did not allow subjects to interact with each other. We believed that
this would reduce the level of ambiguity they would perceive, when asked to make decisions
against each other. In contrast, Keck, Diecidue, and Budescu (2012), conduct an experiment in
which subjects made decisions individually, as a group, and individually after interacting and
exchanging information with others. Subjects were asked to make binary choices between sure
sums of money and ambiguous and risky bets. They found that individuals are more likely
to make ambiguity neutral decisions after interacting with other subjects. Moreover, they nd
that ambiguity seeking and ambiguity averse preferences among individuals are eliminated by
communication and interaction between individuals; and as such, groups are more likely to
make ambiguity neutral decisions.
Greiner (2016) studies the e¤ect of strategic ambiguity in ve kinds of bargaining games -
The dictator game, the ultimatum game, the standard and two variants of the impunity game.
The study nds signicant aversion to strategic uncertainty even with regard to strategies which
are very unlikely to be chosen. In particular, if the second mover has the ability to reject a fair
o¤er, it has an e¤ect on the rst mover, even though in practice participants do not reject o¤ers
of equal splits. This behaviour is inconsistent with rational beliefs and consistency in strategies,
but it was found to be robust across the di¤erent games and subject pools. In our experiments.
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we found that subjects were motivated by fairness criteria, especially in SS1 where 40% of the
subjects select the Nash equilibrium hC;Mi, which gives an equal payo¤ to both players.
Calford (2016) presents an experiment which aims to disentangle the e¤ects of risk and
ambiguity on behaviour in games. In addition, the paper also seeks to separate the e¤ects
of subjects own beliefs over her opponents preferences from the e¤ects of her own prefer-
ences. The data is gathered though laboratory experiments and nds that risk and ambiguity
both a¤ect subject behaviour. It is interesting to note that subjectsreported beliefs of their
opponents preferences are independent of their behaviour in the normal form game.
6.2 Ambiguity in Single Person Decisions
Our Ellsberg urn experiments investigated whether there was any correlation between ambiguity
attitude in games and single person decisions. Moreover, we wanted to evaluate whether there
was any threshold at which individuals switched from being ambiguity averse to being ambiguity
neutral (or seeking). For an extensive survey of the literature on Ellsberg experiments, see
Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015).
Eliaz and Ortoleva (2011) study a three-colour Ellsberg urn with increased ambiguity, in that
the amount of money that subjects can earn also depends on the number of balls of the chosen
colour in the ambiguous urn. The subjects thus face ambiguity on two accounts: the unknown
proportion of balls in the urn as well as the size of the prize money. In their experiment, both
winning and the amount that the subject could possibly win were both perfectly correlated -
either positively or negatively, depending on which of the two treatments was run by them. In
the experiment, most subjects preferred betting in the positively correlated treatment rather
than the negative one. Moreover, subjects also showed a preference for a gamble when there was
positively correlated ambiguity, as opposed to a gamble without any ambiguity. This behaviour
of the subjects, is compatible with our ndings that subjects preferred betting on Y=Z where
there was ambiguity, rather than on X, the known choice.
Binmore, Stewart, and Voorhoeve (2012), test whether subjects are indeed ambiguity averse.
They report that behaviour in their experiments is inconsistent with the Hurwicz criterion.
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Instead, they nd that the principle of insu¢ cient reason has greater predictive power with
respect to their data, than ambiguity aversion. This may also explain why behaviour in games
appears di¤erent to that in Ellsberg urn type experiments. It is harder to apply the principle
of insu¢ cient reason to games. Our results are consistent with these ndings, since we nd
that subjects are not willing to pay even a moderate penalty to avoid ambiguity in the Ellsberg
urn rounds where the payo¤ attached to X were 95=90=85ECU . This might be because in the
absence of information, subjects use the principle of insu¢ cient reason and attach a 50 : 50
probability to the remaining 60 Y and Z balls left in the urn. The principle of insu¢ cient
reason would imply that the probability distribution attached to the X, Y and Z balls in the
urn is (1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
): It would thus be more rational to choose Y or Z and get a payo¤ of 100ECU;
than to choose X and su¤er a penalty, i.e., get pay-o¤s 95=90=85ECU:
In our experiments we did not allow the subjects to communicate or interact with each other.
Charness, Karni, and Levin (2013), test whether individuals display a non-neutral attitude
towards ambiguity, and given a chance to interact, can subjects persuade others to change their
ambiguity attitude. They nd that though a number of their subjects displayed an incoherent
attitude towards ambiguity, a majority of subjects displayed ambiguity neutral preferences. A
small minority (smaller than the number who were ambiguity-incoherent) displayed ambiguity
averse and ambiguity seeking behaviour. More interestingly, they nd that if subjects are
allowed to interact with each other, given the right incentives, ambiguity neutral subjects often
manage to convince ambiguity seeking and ambiguity incoherent subjects to change their mind
and follow ambiguity neutral behaviour.
7 Conclusions
Behaviour in our experiments was found to be consistent with many of our hypotheses. Nash
equilibrium was a poor predictor of subject behaviour and the deviations from Nash behaviour
were in the direction expected. In the games we nd that subjects do indeed choose the
equilibrium action under ambiguity more often than either of the other actions. As predicted
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ambiguity had the opposite e¤ect in games of strategic complements and substitutes.
We tested whether subjects display a greater level of ambiguity-averse behaviour when faced
by a foreign opponent. Although there were some signs of this, the evidence was weak and not
statistically signicant. These results are consistent with an earlier study, where subjects
perception of ambiguity in a public goods setting was analysed Kelsey and le Roux (2016).
One would expect that the ambiguity-safe option would be chosen more often against the
foreign subject and not otherwise. Moreover, it is interesting that our ndings are opposite
to those of Kilka and Weber (2001), who found that subjects are more ambiguity-averse when
the returns of an investment are dependent on foreign securities than when they are linked to
domestic securities. One can note that decisions regarding nancial markets are much more
complex than the act of dealing with other people. It is easier for subjects to conceptualise
another person whom they may be faced against, rather than investments in known/unknown
nancial markets. Follow-up experiments may be run, where subjects are given a choice of
whether they would like to face a foreign opponent in a game, or invest in a foreign security.
It can be noted that the behaviour in game SS2 supports our hypothesis that when faced
by both the foreign subject and the local subject simultaneously, the safe act would be taken
more often against foreign subject. One of the reasons for not picking the ambiguity-safe option
more often against the foreign subject, may be that subjects were trying to be consistent when
making their choices. Alternatively, subjects could see the other local subjects sitting in the
experimental laboratory, whereas the foreign subject seemed very far away. They thus chose to
play cautiously against the local subject, while taking their chances against the foreign subject.
Another reason for subjects choosing the same action against both foreign and local op-
ponents, may be that some students were afraid that if they chose a di¤erent option against
the foreign subject, they might appear racist.23 In an attempt to appear fair, subjects may
have chosen the same option against both opponents. We could avoid this complication in
future experiments, by comparing di¤erent groups of a similar race, such as African-Americans
and Africans. In future experiments, we could have treatments where subjects are allowed to
23This was part of an overheard conversation between subjects, who were talking to each other at the end of
the experiment.
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choose which opponent they would like to face, local or foreign. Furthermore, we could check
if they are willing to pay a penalty in order to avoid facing the foreign opponent. It would be
interesting if subjects were willing to pay a penalty, to avoid an ambiguous foreign opponent,
since this would contrast with what we observed in the single person decisions.
In the Ellsberg Urn rounds we nd that for  = 105 and  = 100 subjects prefer to opt for
X rather than Y or Z, but even the smallest reduction in  leads to subjects choosing Y or Z
(which is the ambiguous choice). When the payo¤ attached to X was 95; 90; or 85; Y +Z was
chosen signicantly more often than X. We notice that the subjects are unwilling to bear even
a small penalty in order to stick with X balls (the unambiguous choice). At the individual level,
we found steep drops in the number of subjects choosing X, for every reduction in the value
of : A very small subset of our subject pool (5%), showed strong ambiguity-averse behaviour
always choosing the ambiguity-safe option in the game rounds and X in the Urn rounds, while
27% of our subjects showed mildly ambiguity-seeking behaviour by opting for Y + Z when
 = 105:
Our subjects appear to perceive more ambiguity and exhibit more ambiguity-aversion in
games. In addition;we note that ambiguity attitudes appear to be context dependent: ambiguity-
loving in single person decisions and ambiguity-averse in games. This is consistent with our
earlier study, Kelsey and le Roux (2015), where we found that the ambiguity-attitude of sub-
jects was dependent on the scenario they were facing. It might be interesting to elicit subjects
preferences on whether they would like to face an opponent or an Ellsberg urn.
It is our belief that subjects nd it more ambiguous to make decisions against other people
than against the random move of nature, over which everyone is equally powerless. This might
even explain why people are more concerned with scenarios involving political turmoil or war -
situations dependent on other people, but appear to discount the seriousness of possible natural
disasters - which are beyond anyones control.
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A Appendix
We shall illustrate Proposition 3.1 by two examples. One a game of strategic complements and
the other a game of strategic substitutes.
Example A.1 Consider Game (SC2) in Table 6.
Table 6: Game SC2
L M R
T 115; 95 115; 100 115; 0
C 0; 95 135; 100 135; 0
B 5; 105 105; 100 105; 135
The game has one pure Nash equilibrium: (C;M):Moreover, if we order the strategy spaces
as follows: T < C < B and L < M < R; the game is one of strategic complements and positive
externalities.
Let the Row Player have the following beliefs : vRP (L) = 1 RP and vRP (M;R) = 0: Then
the Choquet expected pay-o¤s for the Row Player would be: V RP (T ) = 115; V RP (C) = 135RP
and V RP (B) = 5+100RP : Thus, T is the best response for the Row Player if RP  115
135
' 0:85:
Hence if the Row Player is su¢ ciently ambiguous about the opponents behaviour, he would
opt for T , which is the ambiguity safe choice.
Similarly, if the Column Player has the following beliefs : vCP (B) = 1 CP and vCP (T;C) =
0: Then the Choquet expected payo¤ for the Column Player would be: V CP (L) = 100 +
(95  105) CP ; V CP (M) = 100 and V CP (R) = 135  1  CP  : Thus, M is the best response
for the Column Player if CP  135 100
135
' 0:26: Hence if the Column Player perceives su¢ cient
ambiguity about the opponents behaviour, he would choose M , which is the ambiguity safe
option.
The illustrates the proposition that the equilibrium strategy for both players in a game with
strategic complements and positive externalities, decreases with ambiguity. 
We use Game (SS2) in Table 7 below, to illustrate the implications of ambiguity in a game
with strategic substitutes.
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Example A.2 In the Game (SS1); in Table 7 below, an increase in ambiguity will result in
both players using lower strategies in equilibrium.
Table 7: Game SS2
L M R
T 0; 0 70; 0 170; 150
C 100; 70 165; 165 165; 150
B 150; 170 150; 165 150; 150
The game has one pure Nash equilibrium: (C;M):Moreover, if we order the strategy spaces
as follows: T > C > B and L > M > R; the game is one of strategic substitutes and negative
externalities.
Let the Row Player have the following beliefs : vRP (R) = 1   RP and vRP (L;M) = 0:
Then the Choquet expected payo¤ for the Row Player would be:
V RP (T ) = 170
 
1  RP + 0:RP = 170  170RP ;
V RP (C) = 165
 
1  RP + 100:RP = 165  65RP ; V RP (B) = 150:
Thus, B is the best response for the Row Player if 150 > 165  65RP , RP > 3
13
' 0:23;
and 150 > 170  170RP , RP > 2
17
' 0:12:
This means that if the Row Player is su¢ ciently ambiguous (i.e. RP > 0:23) about the
opponents behaviour, he would choose B, which is the ambiguity safe option.
Assume the Column Player has the following beliefs : vCP (B) = 1 CP and vCP (T;C) = 0:
Then his Choquet expected pay-o¤s are: V CP (L) = 170  170CP ; V CP (M) = 165  165CP ;
V CP (R) = 150:
The Column Player would thus prefer R to M if, 150 > 165  165CP , CP > 15
165
= 1
11
'
0:09: He would prefer R to L if, 150 > 170  170CP , CP > 2
17
' 0:12:
Hence if the Column Player perceives su¢ cient ambiguity (i.e. CP > 0:12) about the
opponents behaviour, he would choose the ambiguity safe option, R. 
This illustrates that the equilibrium response for both players in a game with strategic
substitutes and negative externalities, given su¢ cient ambiguity decreases ambiguity.
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